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I, was overruled 




A. No. 238!12. ln Bank .June 28, 1956.] 
nCTCm TmSNY, Appellant, v. BILLY WILDER 
et Hespondents. 
Judgments-Summary Judgments-Issues Precluding Judg-
ment.--'l'he issue to be detPnnined by the trint court in ruling 
a motion for summary judgment is whether or not the party 
the motion has presented an:~ fncts which nsP 
n triable is~ue or defense, and not to pass on or determine 
tnw facts in the case. 
[2] !d.-Summary Judgments-Opposing Affidavits.····'r!lC facts 
in nffidaYits of the party ag·ninst whom a motion for 
summary judgment is made must be accepb•d as tru<:, and 
be sufficient such affl(laYits need not he composed 
of facts. 
[ 3] !d.-Summary Judgments-Affidavits.-A summary judgment 
proper only if affidavits in support of the moYing pnrty 
wnuld he sufficient to sustain a judgment in his fn;;or, nml his 
See Cal.Jur.2d, ,Judgments, § 38 et seq. 
Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § Judgment~<. 
: fl); [3] Judgments, §Sa (8); ['1] Appeal and Error, § 868; 
0, 1:.:-18, 25-27, 29-50, 53, 54, 57] Literary Property: [6] 
~ 12: Property, ~ 1; [19] Actions, § 19: [20] Cnn-
~ :3; 121·231 Contracts, § 4: Evidenee, ~ 327; [28] 
~ 95; [ 611 Agency, ~ 194; [52] Judgment~, ~ 8n (11) : 
Pleading, .~ 273; [.56] Pleading, § 175(1); [58] Appeal and 
Ennr. § 62. 
-
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docs not by affidavit or affidavits show such facts 
as mav be deemed the judge the motion sufficient 
to • a triabl" issue of fact. 
[ 4] Appeal-Briefs.-A court is not hound to accept 
concessions of as establishing the law applicable to a 
case. 
Literary Property-Contracts-Consideration.-The act of dis-
an unprotectible if that act is in fact the bar-
gained-for exchange for a promise, may be consideration to 
support the promise. 
[6] Contracts-Consent.-One party cannot, by unilateral words or 
deeds, thrust on another a contractual relationship unless the 
latter has, by his own words or deeds, consented thereto. 
[7] Literary Property-Contracts.-An idea which before convey-
ance has sufficient Yalue to constitute consideration for a 
promise to pay its reasonable value does not necessarily and 
on disclosure become devoid of value, so that as 
a matter of law it cannot support a promise then made to 
pay its reasonable value. 
[8] !d.-Subject Matter-Ideas.~Generally speaking, ideas are as 
free as the air and as speech and the senses, but there can be 
circumstances when neither air nor ideas may be acquired 
without cost. 
[9] !d.-Subject Matter-Ideas.-Ideas are not freely usable by 
the entertainment media until the latter are made aware of 
them. 
[10] !d.-Subject Matter-Ideas.~An idea is usually not regarded 
as property, because all sentient lwings may conceive and 
evolve ideas throughout the gamut of their powers of cerebra-
tion and because our concept of property implies something 
which may be owned and possessed to the exclusion of all 
other persons. 
[11] Property-Constituent Elements.-£ln essential element of 
individual property is the legal right to exclude others from 
enjoying it; if the property is priYate the right of exclusion 
may be absolute, but if the property is affected with a public 
interest the right of exclusion is qualified. 
[12] Literary Property-Subject Matter-Ideas.-The fact that a 
product of the mind has cost its producer money and labor, 
and has a value for which otherfl are willing to pay, is not 
sufficient to ensure to its producer the right to exclude others 
from enjoying it. 
[13] !d.-Subject Matter-Ideas.--The doctrine that an author has 
a property right in his ideas and is entitled to demand for 
[10] See Am.Jur., Literary Property and Copyright, § 5. 
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narticn.lar combination of ideas this must presuppose 
or in the form in which ideas are e:m· 
be none in the ideas. 
"'"··-"'"'·"J''""' Matter-Ideas.-Neither common law nor statu-
""'~"•·inolh+ extends to an idea as only in 
of a work 
and seek to 
a Hi~>vLJll>; 
the difference 
eharaeter of the evidenee 
and Implied Contracts.-Contracts are either 
made in faet or the obligation is implied by law. 
Id.-.Expr1ass and Implied Contracts.-If made in con-
be established by direct evidence or they may be 
inferred eircumstantial evidenee, and in either case 
appear to be express contracts; otherwise they, or the pre-
sumed contractual obligation, must be by law. 
Id.-lEixt>reJ>s and Implied Oontraets.-A so-called "implied-
in-fact" contract :may be found although there has been no 
u't"'"''u;,; of the :minds. 
See Oal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 4 et seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts, 
seq. 
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Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence.~An express contract 
found where there has been no of the 
under the parol evidence 
evidence of a written contract as the contract and, 
:subject to certain exceptions, precludes oral evidence to show 
that the minds of the parties did not meet in the 
Literary of an idea can 
constitute valuable consideration and can be for 
before it is disclosed to the but once it is 
i. e., disclosed to it, it is 
henceforth his own and he and use it as 
he sees fit. 
[26] Id.-Contracts.-In the field of entertainment the producer 
may properly and Yalidly agree that he will pay for the service 
of conveying to him ideas which are valuable and which he can 
put to valuable use. 
[27] Id.-Contracts.-Where an idea has been conveyed with 
expectation by the purveyor that compensation will be paid if 
the idea is used, the producer who has been the beneficiary 
of the conveyance of such idea, and who finds it valuable and 
is profiting by it, may then for the first time, although he is 
not at that time under any legal obligation to do so, promise 
to pay a reasonable compensation for such idea-that is, for 
the past service of furnishing it to him-and thus create a 
valid obligation. 
[28] Contracts-Consideration-Past Services.-The moral obliga-
tion arising from a benefit of a material or pecuniary kind 
conferred on a promisor by past services, rendered in the 
expectation that they were to be paid for-or, at least, if 
rendered on the assumption by the person rendering them, 
thongh mistaken, that they would create a real liability-and, 
otherwise, in circmnstances creating a moral obligation on the 
promisor's part to pay for the same, will support an executory 
promise to do so although there was, previous to such promise, 
no legal liability or promise, perfect or imperfect. 
[29] Literary Property-Contracts.-Assuming legality of consid-
eration, the idea purveyor cannot prevail in an action to 
recover compensation for an abstract idea unless before or 
after disclosure he has obtained an express promise to pay, or 
the circumstances preceding and attending disclosure, together 
with the conduct of the offeree acting with knowledg·e of the 
circumstances, show a promise of the type nsually referred to 
as "implied" or "implied-in-fact." 
[30] Id.-Contracts.-If the idea pnrveyor has clearly conditioned 
his offer to convey the idea on an obligation to pay for it if it is 
used by the offeree and the offeree, knowing the condition 
before he knows the idea, voluntarily accepts its disclosure 
[31 
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have made an express called im-




§ 1584, that 
the consideration with a proposal, is an acceptance 
the proposal," has no application to conveyance of an idea 
the offeree has an opportunity to reject the consid-
eration-the proffered conveyance of the idea-before it is 
unless the offeree has opportunity to reject he 
eannot be said to 
Id.-Contracts.-The law will not, from demands stated sub-
se<InEmt to the unconditional disclosure of an abstract 
a promise to pay for the idea,· for its use, or for its 
~-,,~,_,,~ disclosure. 
Id.-Contracts.-The law will not imply a promise to pay 
for an idea from the mere facts that the idea has been 
is valuable, and has been used for profit, though the 
conveyance has been made with the hope or expectation that 
obligation will ensue. 
Id.-Contracts.-In an action to recover the reasonable value 
plaintiff's story for a motion picture by defendants, a eon-
tract to pay for conveyance of an abstract photoplay idea 
could not be inferred from plaintiff's disclosure of his basic 
idea to the producer's secretary in a telephone conversation 
though the mere fact that the idea had been disclosed 
would not preclude the finding of an implied (inferred in fact) 
contract to pay for a synopsis embodying, implementing and 
uu<<p•lllo the idea for photoplay production. 
Id.-Defi.nition.-"Literary property" is a general term which 
used either to describe the interest of an author (or those 
who claim under him) in his works (whether before or after 
or before or after copyright has been secured) or 
denote the corporeal property in which an intellectual 
pr~)dttctiLon is embodied. 
Id.-Law Protecting.-Literary property in an intelleetual 
is afforded protection by the common law, by 
statute pursuant to constitutional authorization (U.S. 
art. I, § 8), and by state law (Cal. Civ. Code, § 980). 
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Id.-Distinctions.-The basic distinction between the in 
and to as they may exist at common law 
and as they are granted by statutory copyright is that the 
common law proteets only a property right while the copy-
right statute grants a limited monopolistic 
!d.-Source of Claim.-Where plaintiff has no statutory copy-
right to a his claim for for 
use of such property 
or in contract. 
Id.-Remedies.-If plaintiii has a literary it may 
be the subject of a property right and its use by defendants 
in a photoplay, if established, could entitle him to remedies 
which would be unavailable if he had only an idea to be 
appropriated or to be the subject of contract. 
[41] Id.-Creation.-Literary property which is protectible may 
be created out of unprotectible material, such as historical 
events. 
[42] !d.-Originality and Novelty.-A literary composition does 
not depend on novelty of plot or theme for the status of 
"property"; it may be original, at least in a subjective sense, 
without being novel. 
[43] Id.-Originality.-To he original a literary composition must 
be a creation or construction of the author, not a mere copy of 
another's work, though the author must almost inevitably work 
from old materials, from known themes or plots or historical 
events. 
[ 44] Id.-Creation.--Creation, in its technical sense, is not essen-
tial to vest one with ownership of rights in intellectual prop-
erty, since a compiler who merely gathers and arranges, in 
some concrete form, materials which are opPn and accessible 
to all who have the mind to work with like diligence, is as 
much the owner of the result of his labors as if his work were 
a creation rather than a construction. 
[45] Id.-Originality.-While the finished work of an author prob-
ably will not be novel because it deals only with the puhlic 
domain or public <'O!lllllOns fad~, the finished composition may 
be the original product of the researcher who compiles or 
constructs it; he gives it genesis, and genesis in this sense 
requires qnly origin of the composition, not of the theme. 
[ 46] !d.-Contract.-A literary composition may possess value in 
someone's estimation and be the subject of contract. 
[47] !d.-Right to Use Story or Synopsis.-A motion picture pro-
ducer and a distributor of films have a right to have their own 
employees conduct a research into an historical event in the 
public domain and prepare a story based on those facts and 
to translate it into a script for a photoplay, but they have no 
[ 
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r 46 c.2c1 715; 299 P .2c1 
him. 
!d.-Obligation to Pay for Composition or Idea.· 
words his 
use it hut J will not pay you 
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of the 
Id.--Protectibility.-In an action to recover the n•nconahle 
it is not 
possess 
of con-
an adion to reeover the 
J'Pasomlhle value of :;tory for a photoplay defend-
the mere faet that at the time of plaintiff's flrst telephone 
e:lll to the produel,r's office he de:seribed the central itlea of 
the story to the SPeretary in respmL'C to hPr insistenee that he 
the purpoc;e of his call would nut as a nmtter of law 
plaintiff of the to paymeut fot the story as 
diseus:-;ed by him and the when he again ~poke \Vith 
her two days later and at her request read his to her, 
for her to take down in shorthand for def<'lHlants' eonsidera-
sinee the two eonversations were 
ndion and must be eonstrued as sueh. 
of n single trans-
Agency-Relation Between Principal and Third Person-Im-
putation of Agent's Knowledge.---lf a se(,retary has authority 
to rPeeive and translllit lll<'Soagcs to her employer--such a,; 
nwssages offpring to sell n story em hodying a writer's idea for 
photoplay-and to take down in shorthand for transmission 
to her employer the of a she also 
has authority to n•ceiv<; and transmit the eonditions and 
terms of the offer, and her knowledge of those terms and 
conditions is the knowledge of her employer. 
[52] Judgments-Summary Judgments--AppeaL-On appeal from 
a summary judgnwnt for defendants in an aetion to recover 
the reusonahle Yalue of plainiifT':s Lut' n phiJiuplay by 
dPfendants, a eompnrison betwc>en plaintiff'R of the 
and dcfc•ndants' produdion revealed sufflcient similarity 
hoth in respect to the historical data and the fictional matm·inl 
m·iginnted hy plaintiff as to indieate that n factual issnP, rather 
thnn one of Jaw, was rn·esPnted as to wlwther drf'cndnnts usPd 
plaintiff's or denloped their production independently 
thPrcof. 
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domain facts person or 
in the abstract idea of a those 
facts, but the fact that he used domain material in 
his and synopsis would afford no justifi-
cation for defendants to composition 
and use it in the production a including the 
of a scenario for without plaintiff 
for the value of his and the further fact that the basic 
idea for the photoplay had been conveyed to defendants before 
they saw plaintiff's synopsis would not preclude the finding 
of an (inferred-in-fact) contract to pay for the manu-
script, including its implemented idea, if they used such 
manuscript. 
[55] Pleading-Variance-Immaterial Variance.-In an action to 
recover the reasonable value of plaintiff's story for a photoplay 
by defendants, the variance between plaintiff's pleading alleg-
ing submission of the entire story to defendants and proof 
showing submission of only a synopsis did not mislead defend-
ants, it appearing that they, when making their motion for 
summary judgment, relied on plaintiff's testimony that he had 
submitted his synopsis to them rather than the entire story, 
and such variance did not constitute a complete failure of 
proof of the general scope and meaning of plaintiff's claim, 
but merely a showing that his story was submitted in shorter 
form than alleged in the complaint. 
[56] Id.-Amendment.-Great liberality is indulged in matters of 
amendment to the end that lawsuits may be determined on 
their merits. 
[57] Literary Property-Pleading-Amendment.-In an action to 
recover the reasonable value of plaintiff's story for a photoplay 
by defendants, a proposed amendment of the complaint to 
show that a synopsis rather than the entire story had been 
submitted to defendants would not rise to a wholly 
distinct legal obligation against defendants, but would only 
make the pleading conform to plaintiff's testimony as to the 
manner in which his story was submitted, and the amendment 







Isaac Pacht and Gordon 
of 
William W. Alsup, 
,.,,,,,,vtHL Jr., Louis W. Myers, 
B. Nimmer for nespj::m<lertts. 
Cruikshank, 
L. Gershon as 
J.-Plaintiff appeals from a summary judg-
rendered him in action to recover the 
rei'iSoname value of a literary composition, or of an idea for a 
a synopsis of which composition, embodying the 
asserts he to defendants for and which 
and plaintiff alleges, were and used 
defendants in producing a photoplay. 
case as presented to us is perplexed by prob-
some of appear only upon a composite view of 
p1e~aamg:s, the and the briefs on appeal. Among 
"'w'""'"•vvco are these: Is the plaintiff seeking to recover 
conveyance1 of an abstract idea or (b) the sale 
there be some who would question use of the word "conveyance" 
it is noted that no less an authority than Coleridge 
of "words e.onvey feelings, and words that :dash images." 
use in this opinion the term ''conveyance'' seems slightly 
aceurate than the word ' 'disclosure.'' 




To answer the above listed 
of confidence 
stance of the 
with any substantial 
statement of the factual sub-
of the natnre of the judg. 
from and the rules governing our consideration 
also with some discussion of the law of ideas, 
the law of property, and the law of contracts as it 
relates to transactions ideas and literary property, 
with definitive of the somewhat differing situations 
to which, as descriptive of the "contract" or obligation, some 
authorities the terms ''express,'' ''inferred,'' ''implied 
in fact,'' '' '' or ''quasi-contractual,'' and the 
significance of the subjective and objective tests in deter-
mining contractual (·xistence under the several pm;sibly perti-
nent theories. 
After threading the maze, we have concluded, for reasons 
hereinafter stated, that the summary judgment in favor of 
defendants was erroneously granted and should be reversed. 
The Pleadings. 'l'he complaint2 alleges (Count I) that 
''Plaintiff conceived, originated and eompleted a certain un-
titled literary and drainatic composition (hereinafter called 
'Plaintiff's Property') based upon the life of Floyd Collins. 
Plaintiff has, at all times . . . been, and now is, the sole 
. . . owner of Plaintiff's Property, . . . Plaintiff submitted 
Plaintiff's Property to the Defendants ... In making said 
submission, Plaintiff stated . . . that it was made for the 
purpose of sale of Plaintiff's Property to Defendants to be 
used ... only if Defendants paid to Plaintiff the reasonable 
value thereof. Defendants accepted submission of Plaintiff's 
Property ... [Shortly after aceepting submission of plain-
tiff's property defendants] commeneed the preparation of and 
... aetually photographed a motion pieture photoplay en-
titled 'AcE IN Tim HoLE, '[ 31 [and have exhibited the same] 
.. At all times [concerned] ... the Defendants knew ... 
2 For brevity, plaintiff's first amended complaint is referred to as the 
complaint. 



































were denied by 
defendants filed 
in his favor, and . . . 
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Contract is 
rules above it appears 
record that defendant Wilder at the times 
defendant Paramount Pic-
hereinafter referred to as Para-
or director, or a combina-
1949, plaintiff telephoned 
Wilder's , who was also employed 
and plaintiff stated that he wished 
to see Wilder. At the secretary's insistence that plaintiff 
explain his purpose, plaintiff "told her about this fantastic 
unusual story .... I described to her the story in a few 
words. . . . I told her that it was the life of Floyd 
Collins who was trapped and made sensational news for 
two weeks . . . and I told her the plot. . . . I described to her 
the entrapment and the death, in ten minutes, probably. She 
seemed very much interested and she liked it. . . . The main 
emphasis was the central idea, which was the entrapment, 
this boy who was trapped in a cave eighty-some feet deep. 
I also told her the picture had never been made with a cave 
background before.'' Plaintiff sought to send Wilder a copy 
of the but when the secretary learned of its length 
of some 65 pages she stated that Wilder would not read it, 
that he wanted stories in synopsis form, that the story would 
first be sent to the and ''in case they think 
it is fantastic and wonderful, they will abbreviate it and 
condense it in about three or four pages, and the producers 
and directors get to see it.'' Plaintiff protested that he 
preferred to do the abbreviating of the story himself, and 
the secretary suggested that he do so. Two days later plain-
tiff, after preparing a three or four page outline of the 
story, telephoned Wilder's office a second time and told the 
secretary the synopsis was ready. The secretary requested 
plaintiff to read the synopsis to her over the telephone so 
that she could take it down in shorthand, and plaintiff did so. 
During the conversation the secretary told plaintiff that the 















know." Plaintiff on his 
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could use the if him "the 
value of it . . . I made it clear to her that I wrote 
ry and that I wanted to sell it. I men-
that this was my which has taken 
much effort and research and and therefore if 
used it will have to pay it . . . said 
Wilder of Paramount uses 
pay you for it.' '' did not remember whether 
first conversation with the anything 
id his purpose of the story to defend-
~e did not at any time defendant Wilder. 
that one of authorized functions 
was to receive and deliver messages to 
and hence, as is developed infra, that on this record 
ow ledge would be his Plaintiff's only sub-
contact with the was a telephone call to her 
to the alleged use of composition 
idea in a photoplay produced and exhibited defendants. 
as hereinafter shown in some detail, closely 
both plaintiff's synopsis and the historical material 
the life and death of Collins. It also in-
a fictional incident whieh appears in plaintiff's synopsis 
which he claims is his creation, in the sense 
both original and novel in its combination with the 
from the public commons5 or public domain. 
Although defendants in their answer deny submission of plainti:B''s 
nevertheless defendants state that for the motion for 
nl,,ln·f;ff' did make a sub-
testimony in his deposition. 
mn-nm'i:Arl faet of submission would 
it is not eontested in the making 
term "publie commons" is used and defined 
of the Los Bar (of eounsel for in a paper 
in 42 59. Mr. Carman used the 
elements can under no 
""''"avt~ and avoided the more usual 
leads to confusion. 'Public 
eleJcne11ts, but it includes also any 
published works whieh were not initially by 
or on which such has in faet 
works are for use 
plainti:B' or defendant, it is not the law plainti:B' 's 
"'"'"""'+" interest is inevitably defeated by the prior existence 
works in the 'publie domain.' '' For the purposes 
it is, however, unnecessary to observe the distinction 
by Mr. Carman. 
[4G ''J,2d 




to be the ba::;is foe n'eovery under the law of plagiarism or 
It is conceded that the plaintiff first obtained 
the central i<lea or theme of his , which involves the 
entrapment of a man in an cave and the national 
interest the rescue from the 
Floyd Collins incident whi<~h occurred in the 1920's. 
"It is 's however, that in 
of the lower court committed reversible error in 
granting a summary judgment in this case for the reason 
that the summary judgment had the effect of denying the 
plaintiff the right to prove that his idea or synopsis was the 
subject of a contract wherein the defendants promised to pay 
him for it if they used it. It is clear that 'idt>as,' as such, 
may still be the of a contract in California and may 
be as such, evrn though not protectible under the 
laws of plagiarism." 
Plaintiff also assert,; that he ''is not suing defendants for 
plagiarizing his idea bnt is suing defendants because they 
agreed to pay him tllP reasonable value of the use of his 
idea and story if they used his idt>a'' and that 
"defendants so used plaintiff's idea and synopsis but refused 
to pay him as they agrPed. '' But the complaint, as already 
shown, that ''Plaintiff conceived, originated and com-
pleted [and offered for sale to and defendants accepted sub-
mission of and thereafter used] a certain untitled literary 
and dramatic eomposition (hereinafter called 'Plaintiff's 
Property') based upon the life of Ployd Collins." 
If plaintiff is srekillg to recover for a mere abstract, 
unprotectible idea, he must meet eertain rules; if he seeks 
recovery for a literary composition in which he conceivably 
had a property right, the rules are qnite different, as will 
subsequently be shown. 
It may be that plaintiff's concessions and arguments, 111 
the light of the plradings and evidence, are intended to 
suggest that there is some nebulous middle area between an 
abstract idea and a literary composition, wherein the idea 
has been cast in "concrete" form but not "concrete" enough 
to constitute a literary property. (See generally, Melville B. 
Nimmer of the Los Angeles Bar, writing in 27 So.Cal.L.Rev. 
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case we find it unnecessary and undesirable to recog-
nize such hybrid, although >ve arc mvare that the 
Conrt of the United States has spoken of a "quasi property" 
iu news gathered and disseminated by a news seniee 
(See International News Service v. Assoc,iatecl Press 
8), 248 U. S. 215, 242 [39 S.Ct 68, 63 hEd. 211, 
221, 2 A.L.R. 293].) 'rl1e plaiu tiff here, we conclude, 
must stand or fall, and this case will be on rules 
to ideas on the one hand or literary property on 
the other. 
This court, of course, is not bound to accept con-
of parties as establishing the law applicable to a case. 
v. Clark (1901), 133 Cal. 196, 209-210 [ 65 P. 395] ; 
v. Bcrniker (1947), 30 Cal.2d 439, 449 [182 P.2d 
557] ) It is also to be noted that plaintiff's concession is 
iiied by the words ''for purposes of argument.'' Hence, 
although plaintiff makes it clear that he is not suing for 
"plagiarism or infringement," we feel constrained to the 
yiew that in the light of the entire record we cannot disregard 
a possible property right interest in the literary composition 
as a subJect of contract, express or implied, \vhieh could 
afford a basi:,; for recovery. 
[5] Defendants concede, as they must, that ''the aet of 
diselosing an unprotectible idea, if that aet is in fact the 
bargained-for exchange for a promise, may be consideration 
to support the promise." They then add, "But once the 
idea is disclosed without the protection of a contract, the law 
~ays that anyone is free to use it. Therefore, subsequent 
use of the idea cannot constitute consideration so as to 
support a promise to pay for such use." And as to the effect 
of the evidence defendants argue that plaintiff ''disclosed 
his material before ... [defendants] did or could do any-
thing to indicate their willingness or unwillingness to pay for 
the disclosure. The act of using the idea, from which appel-
lant attempts to imply a promise to pay, came long after 
the disclosure ... Accordingly, even if a promise to pay 
eonld be found . . . it came after the disclosure had been 
made and is therefore unenforceable." The conclusion of 
law assPrted in the last sentence, insofar as it might be 
applieable to an express (whether proved by dired or by 
circumstantial evidence) promise to pay for the S('rvie(• (the 
emweyance of the idea) prPvionsly ren(lered from which a 
profit has b(•en d<'rived, for reasons which hereinafter appear 
pp. 803-804), is not tenable. 
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Relative to the of inferred or 
Assoeiation of Motion Picture Pro-
and Four 
are eoncerned with the state of the law. 
that what eonceive to be 
wherein the Jaw but presumes 
the of which he not did not 
make but will be confused with 
circumstances which evidence actual but 
contracts; i. e., what they appear to consider to be 
termed contracts. [6] They cau-
tion us that in a situation such as ''One cannot 
by unilateral words or deeds, thrust upon another a contrac: 
tual relationship unless the latter by his own words or 
deeds, consented thereto" and that "In the absence of mani-
fest assent to the same thing upon the same terms by both 
parties, there is no contract." \Vith the first of tl1ese cau-
tionary propositions we unqualifiedly agree. Our agreement 
with the second, as will hereinafter appear, must depend on 
what it meant by ''manifest assent.'' [7] We do not agree 
with the further proposition, asserted or implied by defendants 
and their related amici, that an idea which before conveyance 
has sufficient value to eonstitute consideration for a promise 
to pay its reasonable value neeessarily and ipso facto upon 
diselosure becomes devoid of value so that as a matter of law 
it eannot support a promise then-and only then-made to 
pay its reasonable value. A promise, made in advance of 
disclosure, to pay for the aet of conveyanee or disclosure 
of an idea which may or may not have value is one thing. A 
promise, made after conveyance of the idea to the promisor, 
to pay reasonable value for an idea which does have value 
to the promisor and ,,-hich has been eonveyed to, and has been 
used him is another eontraet, the possible enforeeability 
of "\vhieh is discussed infm at pages 803-804. 
From what has been indieated above it appears necessary 
for us in the proper disposition of this case, having in mind 
the problems whieh apparently will eonfront the trial eourt 
at a trial on the merits and the duty imposed on us by 
seetion 53 of the Code of Civil Proeedure, to consider not 
only ( 1) the rules for recovery pertaining to the conveyance 
of ideas, as such, but also (2) the question whether the 
synopsis of plaintiff's untitled composition eould on any view 
of the evidence be deemed entitled to the status of .a literary 

























and the senses, and 
mt;er<lStJn~ or drab, as the 
and other variables of 
}iSt,emlr may combine to to or to compre-
But there can be circumstances when neither air nor 
may be without cost. diver who goes 
in the sea, even as the pilot who ascends in the 
,,u,LLv"-"· knows full well that for life itself or someone 
must arrange for air (or its respiration-essential 
to be specially provided at the time and 
of The theatrical producer likewise may be de-
for his business life on the procurement of ideas from 
persons as well as the dressing up and portrayal of 
conceptions ; he may not find his own sufficient for 
·vaL [9] As counsel for the Writers Guild aptly say, 
''are not freely usable by the entertainment media until 
latter are made aware of them.'' The producer may think 
idea himself, dress it and portray it ; or he may 
either the conveyance of the idea alone or a manu-
embodying the idea in the author's concept of a literary 
giving it form, adaptation and expression. It cannot 
that some ideas are of value to a producer. 
An idea is usually not regarded as property, because 
sentient beings may conceive aud ideas throughout 
of their powers of cerebration and because our 
of property implies something which may be owned 
po~>sessea to the exclusion of all other persons. [11] We 
as an accurate statement of the law in this respect the 
language of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in 
•.nT1'""''n News Service v. Associated Press (1918), supra, 
S. 215, 250 [39 S.Ct. 68, 76, 63 L.Ed. 211, 225]: "An 
element of individual property is the legal right 
elude from enjoying it. If the property is private, 
t of exclusion may be absolute ; if the property is 
with a public interest, the right of exclusion is 
[12] But the fact that a product of the mind 
cost its producer money and labor, and has a value 
which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to ensure 
this legal attribute of property. The general rule of 
that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, 
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after vol-
732 [46 C.2d 
tlll1ary (~ommunieation to others, free as the air to common 
mw. "" [13] Of similar import, but stated negatively: "The 
t1oetrine that an author hao: a property right in his ideas 
and is entitled to demand for them the same protection which 
the law aecords to the proprietor of personal property gener-
ally finds no recognition either in the common law or in the 
statutes of any civilized country.'' ( 34 Am.,J ur. 402-403, § 5 ; 18 
C.,J.S. 143, § 10e; cf. Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc. (1950), 
35 Cal.2d 690, 693-697, 702, 711-712 [221 P.2d 95] ; Burtis v. 
Universal Pictures Co., Inc. (1953), 40 Cal.2d 823, 831 [256 
P.2d 933] ; Kurlan Y. Col1tmbia Broadcasting System 
(1953), 40 Cal.2d 799 [256 P.2d 962].) [14] Whether the 
theory upon which this court sustained recovery in the Golding 
case may properly be classed as a property rights theory is not 
clear (see pp. 694-695 of 35 Cal.2d and pp. 831, 836-837 of 40 
Cal.2d) but it is clear that California does not now accord 
individual property type protection to abstract ideas. ( W eit-
zcnkorn v. Lesser7 (1958), 40 Cal.2d 778, 788-789 [256 P.2d 
947].) This accords with the general weight of authority. 
(See generally, Nimmer, "The Law of Ideas," (1954) 27 So. 
Cal.J_..Rev. 120 et seq. and cases cited.) [15] "There may 
be literary property in a particular combination of ideas [and 
this must presuppose an expression thereof] or in the form 
in which ideas are embodied. There can be none in the 
idras." (Fendle1· v. JJiorosco (1930), 258 N. Y. 281, 287 [171 
N.E. 56, 58].) [16] Neither common law nor statutory 
copyright extends protection to an idea as such. '' [ 0] nly 
"The general rule as stated by Justice Brandeis is not disputed in the 
majority opinion but the latter recognizes what is termed a "quasi 
property'' right in news gathered by the respective competing agencies 
(see p. 73 of 39 S.Ct. [248 U. S. 215, 250, 63 L.Ed. 211, 225]) and 
resolves the case on theories applicable to unfair competition. 
7 For development of the current state of the law in California and the 
somewhat differing and evolving views of the justices see Golding v. 
R.K.O. Pictures (1949), snpra, (Cal.) 208 P.2d 1, 7; id. on rehear-
ing, 35 Cal.2d 690, 701, 710 [ 221 P.2d 95]; Stanley v. Colu-mbia Broad-
casting Syste-m (1949), (Cal.) 208 P.2d 9, 17; id. on rehearing, 
35 Cal.2d 653, 668, 672 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216]; Weitzenlcorn v. 
Lesser (1953), supra, 40 Cal.2d 778, 795; Kurian v. Columbia Broad· 
casting Systen! (1953), snpm, 40 Cal.2d 799, 811, 812, 815; Burtis v. 
Universal Pictures Co., Inc. (1953), s1.1pra, 40 Cal.2d 823, 835, 837. 
It is to be noted that the opinion of Justice Edmonds in the Weitzen· 
korn ease, sometimes referred to as the majority opinion, has the full 
concurrence of but two other justices (Chief Justice Gibson, and .J ustiee 
Shenk), with a limited concurrence by Justice Schauer. Justices Traynor 
and Spence concur only in the judgment and Justice Carter dissents. 
However, any portions of the vVeitzenkorn opinion quoted herein as 
holdings of the court, or cited with approval, are to be understood as 





























,June 1 !l;)fJ I DESXY \Yrr,mm 
[46 C.2d 715; 299 P.2d 2571 
in tlH' ' 'of a copyrightecl work does any mouopol:· 
the 'thPnH',' the 'plot,' the 'ideas' may alway:-; bn 
borrowed.'' (Dellar v. Sarnuel (}oldwyn, Inc. ( 1 84fi, 
A.), 150 F.2d 612.) 
principles aboYe stated do not, howewr, lead to th<' 
that ideas cannot hP a subject of contract. [17] As 
:Hr. ,Justice Traynor stated in his dissenting· opinion in 
v. Columbia BToadcnsfing (1D:30'i. snpra, 35 
Cal 653, 67 4: '' rrhe policy that precludes protection of 
nn abstract idra by eopyright docs not prevent its proi ection 
!J,· •·1.mtract. Even though an idea is not propnty subject 
t<~ exe1 nsiye ownership, its disclosure may be of substantial 
to the person to whom it is disclosed. That c1isc1osnre 
ma,1· therefore be consideration for a promise to pay ... 
Ewn though the idea disclosed ma)· be 'widely known and 
genurally understood' [citation], it may be protretrrl by an 
express contract providing that it will be paid for n·gardless 
uf lack of llOYelty." (Ct. Brunner v. Sti:J:, Baer cf- Puller 
Co. (1044), :)52 :\lo.l22G [181 S.\V.2c1 G-13, 646]; Schrmwald v. 
P. Bud:ai't Jlfg. Co. (JD47), 8:5G lVIo. 43:3 [202 S.W.2d 7].) 
"\miei supporting plaintiil' add, "H a studio wislws to have 
an idPa diseloserl to it and finds that idea of sufficient value 
to make use of it. it is difficult to se\' how any hardship is 
inYolved in requiring payment of the reasonable value of the 
matel'ial submitted." 'l'he pt·ineiples enunciated in the abow 
qnot at ion from Justice Traynor's dissent are accept eel as the 
law of California (!Veifzenkorn v. Lesser (1953), supra, 40 
Cal.2d 778, 791-7~J2) and \H' haw 110 quarrel \vith ill<Jiei 's 
posin lation. Tb is (:ase, howl'Vl'r, rrmaim; to be resol vecl. 
Tile lawyer or doctor vvho applies specialized kJIO\YledgP 
to a state of facts and give~ advice for a fee is selling and 
cotrn:ying an idea. In doiHg that hP is rendering a serviee. 
The lawyer and doctor have no propl'rt~- rights in their 
as ;;uch, but they do not ordinarily eonvey tht•m •vithont 
solieitation by elient or patient. "Csually the parties \\·ill 
rxpn•ss1y contraet for the [H'rformam:e of and payment for 
such services, but, in the abscnee of an express contme1. 
when the scrviee is requested and rtmdered the law does not 
ht•silate to i11fer or impl,\· a peomise to <:ompensate for it. 
!Rre Buck v. C1'ty of Enreka (Ul9!)), 124 Cal. 61, fi6 [5fi P. 
Gl2i; Zunlll'alt v. Sr:hw!lrz ( tr}:n), 112 Cal.App. 7a+, 7:W 
l2fJ7 1'. GOHI; People's Not. Br1ilk v. Oeistlwrdt (18!liij, :J:, 
:Jrb, 2:l2, 2:17-2:!8 [75 N.\V. 582]; 6 Cal..Jnr.2d 378, § 181; 
734 DESNY v. WILDER [46 C.2d 
5 Am.Jur. § 153; 41 Am.Jur. 256, § 142; 7 C.J.S. 1078, 
§ 190 ; 70 1023, § 68; see also v. Rumsey 
(1938), 12 Cal.2d 334, 341-342 P.2d 146].) In other 
words: the recovery may be based on contract either express 
or [18] The person who can and does convey a 
valuable idea to a who commercially solicits the 
service or who that it is 
tendered for a should likewise be entitled to recover. 
In so we do not fail to that free-lance 
writers are not necessarily members of a learned profession 
and as such bound to the exalted standards to which doctors 
and lawyers: are dedicated. So too we are not oblivious of the 
hazards with which producers of the class represented here 
by defendants and their related amici are confronted through 
the unsolicited submission of numerous scripts on public do-
main materials in \vhich public materials the producers 
through their own initiative may well find nuclei for legiti-
mately developing the ''stupendous and colossal.'' [19] The 
law, however, is dedicated to the proposition that for every 
wrong there is a remedy ( Civ. Code, § 3523) and for the sake 
of protecting one party it must not close the forum to the 
other. It will hear both and seek to judge the cause by 
standards fair to both. To that end the law of implied con-
tracts assumes particular importance in literary idea and 
property controversies. 
The Law Pertaining to Contracts, Express, Implied-in-Fact 
and Implied by Law, ancl Quasi Contractual Obligations, as 
Related to Ideas and Literary Property. The parties and 
amici, from their several viewpoints, discuss the law of 
contracts and caution us not to confuse the rules insofar 
as such rules may differentiate respectively among contracts 
which are express or implied-in-fact or implied-in-law, mean-
ing by the latter expression to denote a quasi-contractual obli-
lation imposed by law. vVe agree that whether a contract 
be properly identified as express or as implied-in-fact or 
inferred from circumstances ; or whether the bargain meets 
the subjective test of a meeting of minds or is held to reside 
in the objective evidence of words and acts with or without 
a meeting of minds; or whether the obligation be recognized 
as implied by law from acts having consensual aspects (and 
therefore often termed implied-in-fact) ; or whether the obli-
gation be imposed by law because of acts and intents which, 
although tortious rather than consensual, should in justice 








are established"; see also Silva v. 
Oakland , 14 Cal.2d 762, 773 
rev. vol. 1, p. 8.) 
The same author describes quasi contracts by declaring that 
" contractual obligations are imposed by the law for 
the purpose of bringing about without reference to the 
of the parties, the apparent restriction upon 
the ]lO\Yer of the law to create such obligations is that they 
mnst be of such a sort as would have been appropriately 
mf•m·ed under common-law procedure by a contractual action. 
IJHked even this limitation is too narrow, for a bill in equity 
libel in admiralty might be the appropriate means of 
some quasi contractual obligations. As the law 
ma:>· impose any obligations that justice requires, the only 
limit in the last analysis to the category of quasi contracts is 
that the obligation in question more closely resembles those -
ereated by contract than those created by tort. On the other 
a true contract cannot exist, however desirable it might 
have one, unless there is a manifestation of assent to 
of a promise. Furthermore, the measure of dam-
ages appropriate to contractual obligations differs from that 
to quasi contracts ... It is also true that quasi 
cmli ractual obligations are not so universally based on unjust 
enri(·hment or benefit as is sometimes supposed.8 There are 
many cases where the law enforces in a contractual action a 
to restore the plaintiff to a former status-not merely 
to snrrender the benefit which the defendant has received." 
1 lt were not for precedent we should hesitate to speak 
of implied-in-fact contract. [21] In truth, contracts are 
do <:trine of un juHt enrichment is regarded as usually underlying 
rec\,Yery in quasi contractual situations. (See Jfatarese v. Moore-
JJcConnack Lines (1946, C.C.A.2d), 158 F.2d 631, ()31; Stanley v. 
Col11mbia Broadcasting System (1950), supra, 35 Cal.2d 653, 675, 
Traynor, J., dissenting.) 
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c~ither made in faet or the obligation is implied in law. 
[22] 1 f made in contracts may be established by direct 
eYidence or they may be inferred from circumstantial evi-
denee. The only difference is in the method of proof. In 
l~ither ca:w they won1d apprar to be express eontract::;. Other-
wise, it wonld sePm that they, or the presumrd contractual 
obligation, must be implied at law. [23] A so-called "im-
plied-in-fact" contract, howeyer, as the term is used by some 
writers, may be found although there has been no meeting 
of the minds. [24] Even an express contract may be found 
where there has been no meeting of minds. The classic ex-
ample of this situation is set up by the parol evidence rule. 
The law aeeepts the objective evidence of the written contract 
<ls constituting the contract and, subject, of course, to certain 
exceptions, precludes oral evidence to show that the minds 
of the parties did not meet in the writing. Professor \Villiston 
recognizes in effeet, if not specifically, that the law implies 
(or eonstrues) contractual obligations in many cases where 
there is no trne contract in the historically conventional sense 
and that such implied obligations are of the nature of, and 
governe(1 by the rules applicable to, contracts termed implied-
in-faet by many writers. In a paper published in 14 Illinois 
Law HeYicw 85, 90, Mr. \Villiston says: "The parties may 
be bonnd by the terms of an offer Pven though the offeree 
expressly indicated dissent, provided his action could only 
lawfully mean assent. A buyer who goes into a shop and 
asks and is given [told] the price of an article, cannot take 
it and say 'I decline to pay the price you ask, but will take 
it at its fair value.' He vYill be liable, if the seller elects to 
hold him so liable, not simply as a converter for the fair value 
of the property, bnt as a buyer for the stated price." (See 
Lucy v. Mouflet (1860), 5 H. & N. 229, 232; Wilcox, Ives 
& Co. v. Rogers (1913), 13 Ga.App. 410 [79 S.E. 219]; Rest., 
Contracts. § 5, p. 7; § 72(2), p. 77.) Concerning the same 
subject ProfesRor Co:-;tigan, in a paper published in 33 Har-
vard Law Review 376, at 398, states his view: "Professor 
\Villiston is absolutely right in his contention that the no-
meeting-of-the-minds expr('Ss contracts-the obj(•ctive but not 
subjective test contracts-are properly to be denominated 
c-ontracts instead of quasi-contracts, and the reason for that 
concession >Yas that on their breach the normal contract 
measure of damages is applied. But that same reason has led 














From what has been shown the law of 
and of contracts we that conveyance of an 
can constitute and can be bar-
it is disclosed to the proposed purchaser, 
i. e., disclosed to him and he has 
46 C.2d-24 
[ 46 0.2d ,J 
own and may work with 
In the field of 
the 
if the idea is used 
who has been the bene: 
of such an and who finds it 
valuable is may not then for the first 
he is not at that time under any legal obliga-
to pay a reasonable compensation for 
for the past service of furnishing it to 
him-and thus create a valid obligation. [28] As said in 
12 American 603, section 110, "there is con-
siderable authority which supports the view that the moral 
obligation from a benefit of a material or pecuniary 
kind conferred upon the promisor by past services, rendered in 
the expectation that iYere to be paid for-or, at least. 
if rendered upon the assumption by the person rendering 
them, though mistaken, that they would create a real liability 
-and, otherwise, in circumstances creating a moral obligation 
on the part of the promisor to pay for the same, will support 
an executory promise to do so, although there was, previous 
to such promise, no legal liability or promise, perfect or im-
perfect." (See also Civ. Code, 1605, 1606, quoted s~lpra, 
p. 802; Edson v. Poppe (1910), 24 S.D. 466 [124 N.W. 441, 
26 L.R.A.N.S. 534] ; Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (1895), 
167 Pa. 569 [31 A. 925, 46 Am.St.Rep. 691] ; Gray v. Hamil 
(1889), 82 Ga. 375 [10 S.E. 20:5, 6 L.R.A. 72] ; Credit Bureau 
of San Dz:ego v. Johnson (1943), 61 Cal.App.2d Supp. 834, 
839 [142 P.2d ; 17 A.L.R. 1366-1371, s. 79 A.L.R 1354; 
53 L.R.A. 371-376; 26 L.RA.N.S. 526.) [29] But, as-
suming legality of consideration, the idea purveyor cannot 
prevail in an action to recover compensation for an abstract 
idea unless (a) before or after disclosure he has obtained an 
express promise to pay, or (b) the circumstances preceding 
and attending disclosure, together with the conduct of the 
offeree aeti11g with knowledge of the circumstances, show a 
promise of the type usually referred to as ''implied'' or 
"implied-in-fact. " 9 (See W eitzenkorn v. Lesser (1953), su-
"Such "implied" or "implied-in-faet" contracts are, we think, more 






















the eom1itiom; on which it is tendered. 
tion 1584 of the Civil Code (" he of the eon-
>iilc·n,tion offered IYith a proposal, is an aceeptanee of the 
") ean have no applieation unless the offeree has an 
to rcjeet the consideration--the eonvey-
nJwe of the idea-before it is Unless the offeree has 
nppor1 nnity to reject he cannot be said to (cr. 
Y. Ji'orbalh ( , 5 Cal.App.~d Snpp. 767, 769-770 
.2d 108]; County of Ventura v. Southern Calif. Edison 
048), 85 5:12 [193 P.2•1 512]; Krum v. 
(1948), 22 Ca1.2d 1B2, 135 [J37 P.2c118].) The idea 
mm1 who blurts out his idea without having first made his 
has no one bnt himself to blame for the loss of his 
pmver. [33] The law will not in any 
fro!!; demands stat(•(! to the unconditioned dis-
dosnre of an abstract imply a to pay for thr 
idea. for its use, or for its previous disclo~urr. [34] The 
law will not impl~· a promise to pay for an idea from the mere 
fa(% that the idea bas been eonyeyed, is and has 
bren m:ed for profit; this is trne rycn the eom·e.nmc:e 
lt<J~ bePn ma(le \Yith the hope or (~xpeetation that some oblig'a-
1irm ''··ill ens1w. So, if the plaintiff here only 
for 11w conyeyanre of the iclea of making a dramatic produc-
iion nui of the life of Collins he mnst fail unJe,,s in 
with the above stated rules he can establish a 
contnwt to pay. 
Fnnll plaintiff's as epitomize(l a how ( pp. 
elusion. 
accepted 
it upon the terms on which he had offered it 1 Cer-
tainly the mere fact that the idea had been disclosed under the 
circumstances shown here would not the finding of 
an implied in contract to pay for the synopsis 
embodying, implementing and the idea for photoplay 
production. 
The Law [36] "Liter-
ary a term which is used either to 
describe the interest of an author those who claim under 
him) in his works before after publication or 
before or after copyright has been or to denote the 
in which an intellectual production is 
K"""'"r's Law Diet. , p. 731; 34 Am.Jur. 
§ [37] property in an 
is afforded protection by the common 
law v. Limeriean Co. ( C.C.A. 
2d), 134 F. 321, 68 L.R.A. 591 ; see also 34 Am.J ur. 405-406, 
§ 8), by federal statute to constitutional authoriza-
tion U. S. art. I, § 8; see also title U. S. Code; 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus , 210 U. S. 346 [28 



























and arranges, in some concrete materials which are em 
open and accessible to all who have the mind to work with like to 
is as much the owner of the result of his labors 
as if his vvork were a creation rather than a construction." 
Am.Jnr. § 12 see also 23 A.L.R.2d 265; Amdur on 
69- § 3; Fred Inc. v. (1924), 
150-161 Jewelers' Mercantile v. Jewelers' 
Pttb. Go. ) , 155 N. Y. 241 [ 49 N.E. 872, 41 de1 
63 Am.St.Hep. ; Booth & Hanford Abstract Ob 
Go. v. (1894), 8 Wash. 549 [36 P. 489, 23 L.R.A. 864, pm 
40 Am.St.Hep. 921] ; Leon Loan & Abstract Go. v. Equaliza- hac 
tion Board (1892), 86 Iowa 127 [53 N.W. 94, 17 L.R.A. 199, res' 
41 Am.St.Hep. 486]; Dart v. Woodhmtse (1879), 40 Mich. sis 
399 [29 544].) ant 
\Vriting portraying characters and events and emo- con 
tions with words, no less than with brush and oils-may be an his· 
art which expresses personality. Accordingly, the language bas 
of Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court in pia 
a copyright case relating to circus posters is apropos: ''Others fac 
are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the fen 
copy . . . The copy is the personal reaction o£ an individual offE 
upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. [ 
It expresses singularity even in handwriting, and a very the 
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which a 
is one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless for 
there is a restriction in the words of the act." (Bleistein v. wii 
Donaldson Lithographing Go. (1903), 188 U.S. 239, 249-250 or 
[23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed. 460].) As indicated, the theme of a is, 
writer must almost inevitably be neither novel nor original. con 
[45] The finished work probably will not be novel because 
it deals only with the public domain or public commons 
facts. But the completed composition may well be the original 
product of the researcher who compiles or constructs it. He 
gives it genesis, and genesis in this sense requires only pos 
origin of the composition, not of the theme. The composition corr 
will be the property of the author. Whether it possesses sub- tior 
stantial value, and to what extent, if any, it may be entitled scri 
to copyright protectibility, may be quite another matter. hav 
The time of the author; his resourcefulness in, op- on 
portunity for and extent o£, research; his penetration in per- Ltu 
ception and interpretation of source materials; the acumen of A. 
his axiological appraisals of the dramatic; and his skill and 
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conceiv-
estimation and be the 
it may be considered 
scientific or any 
the used someone 's in pre-
and producing their photoplay. That script must have 
ue to them. As will be hereinafter shown, it 
plaintiff's synopsis. [47] Ergo, plaintiff's synop-
to be a valuable literary composition. Defend-
an unassailable right to have their own 
the research into the Floyd Collins tragedy-an 
event in the public domain-and prepare a story 
on those facts and to translate it into a script for the 
But equally unassailable (assuming the verity of the 
which plaintiff asserts) is plaintiff's position that de-
had no right-exeept by purchase on the terms he 
acquire and use the synopsis prepared by him. 
The proposition which seems to be implicit in some of 
contentions of defendants and their related amici-that 
to whom a literary composition or idea is offered 
sale for its reasonable value if used, may state that he 
not agree to purchase the proffered literary composition, 
idea for one, until he knows what the composition or idea 
may then, when it is submitted to him on those terms, 
it and say, in words or by his acts, "Yes, it is in-
valuable and I shall use it but I will not pay you for 
because now I have it"-does not commend itself to us. 
n .... ,.ro,"•<• ... is not commercially soliciting, and is not willing 
an obligation to pay for, valuable ideas, or for com-
adapting and implementing them, which ideas and 
po:sit:tOTILS are offered to be conveyed only upon the assump-
of such an obligation, he does not need to read manu-
which he knows are submitted on those or to 
his secretary take dictated synopses of stories offered 
conditions, and then use them. (See Elfenbeirn v. 
Terminals, (1933), supra, 111 N.J.L. 67 [166 
93} ; cf. Matarese v. llfoore-McOormick Line;s (1946, 
appears 
must 
that there is triable issue of 
: Did 
to the defendants for sale 
that it \Yas offered to 
composition or any 
knowing 
use that 
If so, what was the reason-
able value of the cornnosinon 
[ 49] It is not essential to recovery that 
or synopsis possess the elements of 
if the fact of consensual contract be 
v. Lesser , supra, 40 Cal.2d 
can we hold, on the state of the 
synopsis is devoid of the clements neces;;;ary to 
measure of such . ·while the trial or an 
may determine the 
in any particular 
appellate court on a sufficient record, 
specific extent of an author's nY'.nn,n''T" 
work v. Universal Pictures 
45 F.2d 119, 
define the limits more 
supra, pages 806-808 also 
' on this appeal to 
been done, 
The Law Applied to the Facts. as conceded by de-
fendants for purposes of their summary judgment motion, 
plaintiff, in accordance witb his submitted his 
synopsis to them through defendant Wilder's secretary and 
such submission included a declaration by both plaintiff and 
the secretary that defendants were to pay for his story if 
they used it. [50] The mere fact that at the time of plain-
tiff's first call to Wilder's office he described the 
central idea of the to the in response to her 
insistence that he the purpose of his call would not as 
a matter of law plaintiff of the to for 
the story as discussed by him and the 
spoke with her two later and at her read his 
synopsis to for her to take down in shorthand for de· 
as mes-
a writer's idea for 
to take down in shorthand for transmission 
the she also ""'""''"cu 
to reeei ve and transmit the conditions and terms 
Her of tho:::e terms and conditions is 
( § 2332 ; Chap-
(1955), 45 Ca1.2d 802 [291 
see also Civ. § 3521: "He who takes the 
benefit must bear the bur(len. ") 
support a that 
through the 
On this issue the evidence 
synopsis reached de-
and that they are chargeable 
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the conditi011s on which the synopsis was 
offered. 
~With to whether defendants used plaintiff's com-
it may be first noted that defendants presented no 
affidavits m any \vay denying such use, but merely exhibited 
their to the court for purposes of comparison be-
hveen and defendants' De-
fendants also produced extracts from a 
paper to which plaintiff had already testified in his 
that he had referred in preparing his story. A 
the photoplay was, however, attached to plaintiff's 
as an exhibit, and plaintiff has provided an outline 
his synopsis10 with defendants' scenario. De-
Synopsis: Plaintiff's synopsis of his story, submitted 
Wilder's secretary as related hereinabove, stated that the 
''story deals with the sensational and tragic end of Floyd Collins who 
lost his life in a cave in Ky. in 1925 and held the whole nation in 
... Since 1925 to the beginning of World War II only the 
stories ... have outdone the Collins story for sustained inter-
est. F. lived with his family in a cave region of Ky .... It was 
nndcrneath his f>tther's farm where F. C. discovered the great Crystal 
Cnve in 1Dl7. Collins was abscessed with cave exploration since his boy-
hood. He gained reputation for discovering many relics left by the 
Indinns which he sold to the tourists ... F. was very much in love 
1vith a girl named Alma ... In the spring of 1918 the Crystal Cave 
was opened for commercial tourists trade ... On January 30, 1925, F. 
was on his way to enter a narrow aperture, his last excursion into the 
cave land. In all his previous trips Floyd had learned to fear a huge 
boulder weighing approximately 100 lbs. which was held in 
point downward, by a small wedge rock, for he knew it 
if he should brush against it. The joy of his new discovery 
ovcTcnme his natural caution. The heavy heel of his new boots struck 
tho rock wedge. Down it crashed with the speed of a lightning flash, 
falling across his loft ankle nnd pinioning both legs, for his right leg 
had been douhled beneath the left. He was held prisoner ... F 's 
father ... spread the alarm. Telephones were busy ... and soon the 
whole countryside was aroused ... The first reporter to reach F. was 
William Burke :\Tiller . . . [who told Collins] 'The world is coming, 
old man,' ... F. told the reporter of a horrifying dream he had had, 
and he feared the curse of the dead Indians for having disturbed their 
graves. fThe idea of the dreams and fears of the trapped man with 
to a curse of dead Indians was fictional or original with plaintiff, 
than historical fact.] ... Lieutenant Burdon from the Louisville 
Ji'ire Department who was led to F. by ... Miller, ... said, 'There 
is only one way to save Collins without maiming him, and that is to 
sink a shaft to him.' 
''A stream of machines and men was moving down the clay road 
... Opposition develops between the natives and the rescue crew .... 
An ugly situation was imminent. 
'''!'he Louisville Conrier-J ournal was bringing the F. C. sensational 
news every day on the front page. v'V. Burke Miller's acceptance of 
danger was instigated, by the lure of Pulitzer Prize which later was 
awarded to him. Cave City was rapidly taking on the appearance of a 
Klondike gold rush town. . .. Miller was the only reporter who saw 
June 
Caw 
DESNY V. \V ILDER 
[46 C.2d 715; 299 P.2d 257] 
brief have likewise outlined 
the as a picnic .... b' 's 
''The shaft was sinking steadily toward the cavern. 
Extremely suspicions accusations were made by some 
to of C. Gov. Field summoned the Bonnl 
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was also directed to run down a most unfortunnte 
by two reporters who considered the "lvhole 
scheme and a hoax ... '' The story ends with 
' Photoplay ScenaTio: Prom material 
defendants, it appeal'S that. the scenario of 
also commences with a mention of 
over the Atlantic,'' and referring to 
''The guy pinned way down in the cave. 
that ever broke. Front IJage on every paper in 
'' Defendants state in their brief that their 
purport to be a biogr::tphy of the life of Floyd 
1wlers, plot and deYelopment are wholly imaginative. Its theme is to 
what might have happened to a group of ... fictional cllarneters 
if they hnd come into contact with a sitnation similar to the 
Collins incident of ] 925.'' 
to defenrbnis' descrintion of their 
clwraetcr is Charles Tatum, a repoi·ter for a newspaper 
Xew ::\Iexico. Tatum had oneo lleen a big·time 
now down on his luck nnd looking for an 
former prominent position. \Vhile traveling 
at a roadside stand and finds that Leo ::\finosa, 
has just been trapped in an old Indian cliff 
recognizes in this event a chance to m·eate an 
to the Floyd Collins incident and to exploit it in his own selfish interest. 
Playing on the greed of the local sheriff and of the mmt 's wif<>, 
Tntnm succeeds in getting the exclusive right to the ra,·e and 
inten·icw the victim, who expresses fear of '' 'l'he Indian dead. They 'ro 
an 11round here. 'l'his is a tomb ... with mummies four hundred years 
old.'' Tatum contrives to prolong the rescue opemtion so ns to inr~casc 
pnhlic interest in the affair and thus increase the yalue of liis exelnsive 
(H·counts of the event. He builds tho affair into a horrible camin!l of 
cheap publicity, pandering to the morbid curiosity of the public. He 
exncts enormous fees for his exclusive stories of the alHl 
rescue operntions and his two selfish, inlnnmm assistnnts 
and the wife) avidly grasp at the profit to be mnde from the 
up. The only difficulty is that the rescac operntion is 
and the trapped man dies. 'ratum is left with the 
careless disregard of consequences has made him in cffcet a 








wall of his 
slanted across 
1HlLU1ae; him down. 
Minosa 's father calls sheriff. 
Tatum is to 
arrive ; tells Minosa not to 
worry, as " you 
out.'' 










porter on Collins 
ceived a Pulitzer Prize. 
re-
Carnival trucks are de-
and persons 
COJllCt)SSlOilS are shown; excur-








Miller is first reporter to 
reach and tells him, 
''The world is coming, old 
man.'' 
Lt. Burdon says, ''There is 
only one to save Collins 
without him, and 
that is to sink a to him." 
develops be-
tween the natives and the 
rescue crew. 
Collins story carried on 
page of Louisville news-
paper every day; Miller was 
later awarded Pulitzer Prize. 
.)! 
is apparent from com~ 
and l'rom the outlineR which are 
that rather than one 
that t!lis conrt view the 
(lt•fr·ndants 111 their brief offer to mab~ 
in orc\er to fl\'tennine wlwther triable i;.;sne of 
The scope of th(~ in that 
to 11s tl1at tlh• issues lwrt• arn llOt fpr swnmary 
1 n the of the eonclusions have reached 
evidenee disenssed it appcm·s that the 
woulcl relate nwrely to the weight of the evidence. 
to 
At the trial the trier of fact should proceed with nicety 
of discrimination in the evidence to resolve the 
Inasmuch as plaintiff's story is taken from 
and that of defendants 
substance accurate, it must be 
borne in mind that the mere facts that plaintiff submitted 
and offered to sell to defendants a synopsis containing public 
domain material and that thereafter defendants used the same 
domain material, will not support an inference that 
defendants promised to pay for either the synopsis or for 
the idea of using the public domain material. [54] The 
can have no property right in the public domain 
Floyd Collins or in the abstract idea of 
a photoplay dramatizing those facts. On the 
other the fact that plaintiff used the public domain 
material in constructing his story and synopsis would afford 
no justification whatsoever for defendants to appropriate 
plaintiff's composition and use it or any part of it in the 
production of a photoplay-and this, of course, includes the 
writing of a scenario for it-without compensating plaintiff 
for the value of his story. And the further fact, if 
it be a fact, that the basic idea for the photoplay had been 
conveyed to defendants before they saw plaintiff's synopsis, 
would not preclude the finding of an implied (inferred-in-
contract to pay for the manuscript, including its imple-
mented idea, if they used such manuscript. 
The Complaint; Failure of Proof, or Variance; Amendment. 
Defendants urge in support of the summary judgment that 
in plaintiff's amended complaint he alleges a con-
tract by defendants to pay him if they used his entire 65-page 
story based upon the life of Floyd Collins, plaintiff's testi-
mony is that such story was actually never submitted to 
uefendants, but rather only the synopsis thereof, and that 
therefore there was a complete failure of proof. Plaintiff, 
following entry of the summary judgment, moved the court 
for au order setting aside the judgment and permitting 
plaintiff to file an amendment to his amended complaint, 
alleging submission of the synopsis inst<:>ad of the 65-page 
story. The motion was denied and defendants argue that 
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upon the merits. \Vhenever 
been so the eourt may 
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amended upon sueh terms as may be Section 470 
that "\Vhere the variance i:;: not m: 
last the court may direct the faet to be fonncl 
to the or may order an immediate amend~ 
Section 4 71 : '' the 
is unproved, not in some particular or 
but in its scope and it is not to be 
a ease of variance, within the last iwo but 
a failure of proof." 
'l'he variance between plaintiff's 
in present case obviously did not mislead 
since \Yhen making their motion for summary 
relied upon his testimony that he had submitted his s.nwpsis 
to rather than the entire 65-page story. (See Chclini 
,-. (1948), 32 Cal.2cl480, 486 [19G P.2d 915].) 
sm·h a variance clearly did not constitute a 
of of the general scope and meaning of plaintiff's claim, 
but merely a showing that his story was submitted in shorter 
than that alleged in the complaint. 
[56] Great liberality is indulged in matters of amendment 
to the end that lawsuits may be determined upon their merits. 
Il.lopstock v. Superior Court (1941), 17 Cal.2d 19-20 
P.2d 906, 135 A.L.R. 318], and cases there cited.) In 
tht' Klopstock case it was dedared that ''In determining 
whether a wholly different cause of action is introdnced by 
the amendment technical considerations or ancient formulae 
are not controlling nothing more is meant than that the 
defendant not be required to answer a wholly different 
1 or obligation from that originally stated. .As the 
eomt says in . . . [Frost v. Witter ( 1901), 132 Cal. 426 
P. 705, 84 Am.St.Rep. 53)], for the purpose of determin-
whether amendment is possible, the 'cause of aetion' 
ref('rred to as furnishing the test means only the obliga-
tion which it is sought to enforce against the defendant. 
Other courts have used almost identical language; the test 
make 
as to the 
manner in which his was submitted to defendants. It 
for defendants' claimed use of the same as that al-
that still would be recovery 
under the Such amendment 
have been allowed. 
Plaintiff has also to from an order 
his motion to set aside the summary and 
him to file an amendment to his amended complaint. 
Such order is not appealable, and the attempted there-
from will be dismissed. (See Bank America v. Oi~ Well 
Co. 12 Cal.App.2d 265, 271 P.2d 885]; 
' 121 834-835 
appeal plaintiff's 
motion to set aside the summary him 
to file the amendment to his amended is dismissed. 
The is affirmed as to the second and third counts 
of the complaint, but as to the first count it is reversed and 
the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent 
"With the views in this 
and Me-
the result reached in the 
the 
discussion of numerous of law wholly in-
and unnecessary to a determination of this matter. 
purpose served such a discussion other than 
to confuse the reader and the future state of the law so far as 
this of is concerned and other cases in general in-
I had it the policy 
of t 
to be 
a motion for a 
triable issues of 
had 
and dramatic eomposi-





showed ihat p1aintiff 
with ilw expectation 
and dramatic 
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were all questions of fact for the trier of In 
other the defendants' motion for summary judgment 
was And the function of 
court is to review the action of the trial court in granting 
that summary other words, to determine 
whether or not triable issues of fact existed. But a majoritv 
of this court has seen fit not to take • 
of but to set forth learned discussions of in-
law and then direct the trier of fact at the new 
trial as to how it should perform its function in the judicial 
field. 
Taking into consideration the of the majority 
opinion, there is no necessity of here reiterating the evidence 
plaintiff's submission of his literary work to de-
fendant ·wilder's secretary. We all are aware, I believe, 
that ideas may be taken from the public domain and woven 
into a plot, or story, which may present something new, 
different, and of value to one in the market for such mer-
chandise. It does not require interminable discussion of how 
many plots there are, nor of what some writers have con-
sidered as plots, nor of the services rendered by doctors, 
lawyers, dentists and the like, to bring home to the average 
attorney that an old theme may be given new interest by 
a different interpretation thereof and that this different 
interpretation may have value to one in the business of pur-
chasing that type of merchandise. 
When we consider the difference in economic and social 
backgrounds of those offering such merchandise for sale and 
those purchasing the same, we are met with the inescapable 
conclusion that it is the seller who stands in the inferior 
bargaining position. It should be borne in mind that pro-
ducers are not easy to contact; that those with authority to 
purchase for radio and television are surrounded by a coterie 
of secretaries and assistants; that magazine editors and pub-
lishers are not readily available to the average person. It 
should also be borne in mind that writers have no way of 
advertising their wares-that, as is most graphically illus-
trated by the present opinion, no producer, publisher, or 
purchaser for radio or television, is going to buy a pig in a 
poke. And, when the writer, in an earnest endeavor to sell 
what he has written, conveys his idea or his different interpre-
tation of an old idea, to such prospective purchaser, he has 
lost the result of his labor, definitely and irrevocably. And, 
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to see, or, as in this 
''I won't tell you what 
'n¥•r\W>HJO to pay me for it, j) it takes no 
out what the answer will be! 
exl:tmple of the practical difficulties 
ov,.u..._,v,_,_,_.u;; to sell-he is not 
.tuu'r"';wru in must convey to her 
the result of his efforts. 
There is no for the superfluous, even 
discussion of the "law to contracts, ex-
and implied-in-law, and quasi-con-
obligations, as related to ideas and literary prop-
'' found in the majority opinion. In California we have 
"''"'"'-'-'ll"' distinctly defining the various types of contracts 
we have not been informed why those code sections are 
to deal with the problem of and literary 
As a matter of fact, if I understand the majority 
it finally comes down to earth and relies on those 
sections. In the majority opinion we find this state-
: ''From what has been shown respecting the law of 
and of contracts we conclude that conveyance of an 
can constitute valuable consideration and can be bar-
for before it is disclosed to the proposed purchaser, 
once it is conveyed, i.e., disclosed to him and he has 
it is henceforth his own and he may work with 
use it as he sees fit. In the field of entertainment the 
may properly and validly agree that he will pay 
the service of conveying to him ideas which are valuable 
which he can put to profitable use. Furthermore, where 
idea has been conveyed with the expectation by the pur-
that compensation will be paid if the idea is used, 
is no reason why the who has been the bene-
the conveyance of such an idea, and who finds it 
<"'-'·"'-''" and is profiting by may not then for the first time, 
'l.btr~~nv•·tuJn he is not at that time under any legal obligation 
do, promise to pay a reasonable co-mpensation for that 
is, for the past service of furnishing it to him-
thus create a valid obligation." (Emphasis added.) 
seems to me most obvious that a seller of literary work 
not disclose his ideas incorporated in his work to a 
n"-"'"""'''.,."m purchaser of the same without an implied under-
"""'uuJlH~ on the part of both that such an idea, if used by the 
(lue to whom it was disclosed, would be paid for by the one 




known to both 
and the other to 
of a department store when merchandise 
counter-it is understood 
the merchandise so 
unnecessary for the 
to state to anyone 
are for sale. I am at any different rules 
should when it is ideas for sale rather than normal 
run of merchandise. true that one need not 
pay for ideas such are in domain but 
when those ideas have been so treated that have worth 
or value to a it is difficult to under-
stand why it is necessary that the should definitely 
state that he is his merchandise to a buyer. 
It appears to me that the 
should be sufficient to raise the inference that if the literary 
work is used by the would 
be paid therefor of how much 
takes to decide whether he will use it. 
